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What is the problem of climate change?
Human activities release greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the
atmosphere. The principal gases involved are carbon dioxide
(CO2) from energy production and use and from deforestation,
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) from agriculture and
land-use change, and three ‘trace gases’ or artificial chemicals,
including halogenated hydrocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride
(SF6). The concentration of these gases in the atmosphere has
already increased from about 275 ppmv (parts per million by
volume) prior to the industrial revolution (up to the year 1750) to
368 ppmv in 2000,1 an increase of 34%. Carbon that has been
stored in the Earth’s crust (in the form of oil, coal, and other fossil
fuels) over millions of years is being released into the atmosphere
relatively rapidly. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), the Earth’s mean surface temperature
increased by about 0.6 ± 0.2°C during the twentieth century.
The certainty in separating the signal of anthropogenic influ-
ences from the ‘noise’ of natural climate variability has increased.
The IPCC reviews the existing literature and publishes assessment
reports summarizing the state of knowledge of climate change.
Its Third Assessment Report evaluated the available evidence
and concluded that ‘there is new and stronger evidence that
most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable
to human activities’.1 The increased confidence compared with
that for the second assessment (issued in 1996) was due in part to
a longer and more closely scrutinized temperature record, new
detection techniques, and model estimates for the last 50 years
that are consistent with observations (for a fuller discussion, see
ref. 1, pp. 10 ff.).
Rising levels of GHGs in the future are expected to continue to
contribute to climate change. If emissions persist in rising, global
temperatures are expected to increase between 1.4 and 5.8°C by
the end of the 21st century.2 This is two to 10 times more than the
observed global warming in the last century; land areas are
expected to warm more than oceans. Different scenarios for
emissions are shaped by major drivers, in particular economic
growth, demographic changes and technological innovation, as
described in an IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios
(SRES).3 These changes are occurring at a relatively rapid rate in
terms of geological time, very likely without precedent in the last
10 000 years.
Climate change is likely to have a significant impact on the
global environment. In general, the faster the climate alters, the
greater will be the risk of associated damage. Mean sea level is
expected to rise 15–95 cm by 2100, causing flooding of low-lying
areas and other devastation. Figure 1 shows the relationship
between increasing temperatures (they differ according to the
details of the emission scenarios) and reasons to be concerned
about the consequences of climate change. The list of impacts is
long, but a few examples will convey the scale of the problem:
the viability of key ecosystems is put at risk by a temperature
change of only 1–2°C, including those of coral reefs, arctic eco-
systems, and coastal wetlands. The Greenland ice sheet, which
contains sufficient water to raise sea levels by ~7 metres, would
become unstable with a local warming of 3°C, and gradually lose
its ice mass.4
Who is responsible for the problem — and who has the
capacity to act?
Regional impacts have been studied by the IPCC, which finds
that poor countries and communities are most vulnerable to
the consequences of climate change. This is because of their
relatively high sensitivity to climate disruptions and limited
capacity to adapt, and more limited resources with which to
mitigate the impacts.5 Human society will face, and have to
adapt to, new risks and pressures on food security, water
resources, physical infrastructure and from extreme events —
floods, droughts and severe storms.
The ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in Article 2, is to
stabilize GHG concentrations at levels preventing dangerous
climate change, while allowing ecosystems to adapt, ensuring
food security and allowing sustainable economic development.6
This will require significant effort. Given an expanding global
economy and growing populations, it demands substantially
more efficient use of energy, a switch to cleaner sources of
energy, and fundamental changes in other economic sectors.
The IPCC’s Second Assessment Report averred that ‘immediate
stabilization of the concentration of carbon dioxide at its present
level could only be achieved through an immediate reduction in
its emissions of 50–70% and further reductions thereafter ’.7
By comparison, the Kyoto Protocol targets amount to emissions
reductions of 5.2% from 1990 levels, and only for industrialized
countries. What matters for climate change are cumulative
emissions in the future — reductions that will be required this
century are in the order of magnitude of 1100 to 1500 gigatonnes
(Gt) of CO2-equivalent (GtCO2-eq), while the potential for
mitigation ranges from 13.2 to 18.3 GtCO2-eq per year.
8 Clearly,
there is a large gap between what is required to address the prob-
lem and the current commitments that have been negotiated in
the international arena. The estimated size of the emissions ‘gap’
of Annex I parties (rich countries, excluding the United States
and Australia) is expected to be approximately 275–880 MtCO2-eq
by 2010.9 As of April 2004, the mitigation effort of 77 projects
under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was
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This article takes stock of current knowledge of climate change and
the response to this major problem affecting the environment and
economic development. It begins with a brief review of climate
change science and impacts as assessed by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. It then reports on the status of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto
Protocol, and summarizes national commitments to making the
effort required to mitigate climate change by limiting the emission
of greenhouse gases. The main issues still to be addressed are
identified, focusing in particular on carbon markets and adaptation
funding. Future prospects are considered, including possible
emissions targets for developing countries. The article thus
focuses on the key issues of concern for developing countries.
130 MtCO2-eq up to 2012 (www.cdmwatch.org/quick-stat/),
although this does not count projects that have still to be intro-
duced. More efforts at mitigation can be expected, but the level
of effort needs to increase by an order of magnitude.
The goal of the UNFCCC is to stabilize GHG concentrations,
under certain constraints. The convention recognizes that in
achieving this task equity among nations is crucial, and it estab-
lishes the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities’ (Article 3.1). Since countries are the
Parties to the Convention and the Protocol, some indicators of
national level efforts made to control GHG emissions is appropriate.
The Global Governance Initiative report to the World Economic
Forum provided some useful, albeit imperfect, indicators for
some leading countries (see Table 1), both industrialized and
developing.10 The notion of responsibility is captured in relation
to several indicators, while national income gives some sense of
ability to mitigate. It also records the share of renewables and
status in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. The current and historical
situation represented by these figures provides the historical
context for considering future targets and scenarios (see below).
For this purpose, we turn first to a brief review of the status of the
climate change negotiations.
Negotiations on climate change
The response of the international community to the problem
of climate change is organized under the UNFCCC, adopted at
the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and now includes 186 countries. As
the name indicates, the FCCC is an institutional framework for a
multilateral response to climate change. The highest decision-
making body of the convention is the Conference of the Parties
(COP). All states that have ratified or acceded to the convention
are parties to the FCCC. The COP meets annually, with its two
attendant bodies — the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice, and the Subsidiary Body for Implementa-
tion — meeting between sessions. The COP and subsidiary
bodies are serviced by a secretariat. The COP can review existing
commitments, as well as adopting new ones — such as those
agreed under the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. While the convention
includes commitments, these are not binding.
Under the convention, both rich and poor countries accept
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Fig. 1. Projected temperature changes and reasons for concern.2
commitments to submit ‘national communications’ including
GHG inventories. They agree to adopt national programmes for
mitigation and adaptation. Technology transfer is another broad
commitment. All parties agree to take climate change into account
in policy-making and planning, to cooperate on scientific matters,
and to promote education and the exchange of information. It is
recognized that implementation of commitments by developing
countries will depend on financial and technical assistance from
the rich nations.11
Developed countries (Annex I Parties to the Convention) have
more specific commitments under Article 4.2 of the convention.
For instance, there is a commitment for these nations to take
measures aimed at returning their emissions to 1990 levels by the
year 2000 in FCCC Article 4.2.b (this was not achieved by many
countries — the notable exception was the former Soviet Union,
where emissions declined owing to economic stagnation rather
than climate policy10). The richest countries (Annex II, essentially
the OECD states), agree to provide ‘new and additional financial
resources’ and facilitate technology transfer. Annex II countries
pay the ‘agreed full cost’ of non-Annex I (NAI) national commu-
nications under Article 4.3. They also help fund the transfer of
environmentally sound technologies, particularly for the benefit
of developing countries.
Specific mitigation commitments for industrialized countries
were negotiated and included in the Kyoto Protocol. The parties
to the convention have agreed by consensus that developed
countries will have a legally binding commitment to reduce their
collective emissions of six GHGs by at least 5% compared with
1990 levels during the period 2008–12. The protocol establishes
three ‘flexible mechanisms’: an emissions trading regime which
allows assigned amounts to be traded under Article 17; Joint
Implementation (JI) — a project-based mechanism involving
Annex I parties under Article 6; and the Clean Development
Mechanism, which allows investment by Annex I parties in
projects in developing countries under Article 12. These mecha-
nisms assist Annex I parties in achieving their emission reductions
at least cost. The CDM includes a second objective of assisting
developing countries in achieving sustainable development.
The convention and protocol already embrace many commit-
ments on adaptation. All parties to the convention have agreed
that ‘the specific needs and special circumstances of developing
country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable
to the adverse effects of climate change ‘should be given full
consideration’ (Article 3.2). While all parties are to cooperate
in general adaptation activities, the commitment to ‘agreed
full costs’ includes development of national vulnerability and
adaptation assessments and incremental costs for adaptation
technologies.
Although the focus of the Kyoto Protocol is on establishing
targets for GHG reductions and mechanisms for achieving it, it is
also structured to assist in generating funding to address adapta-
tion needs. Parties to the protocol have agreed, in Article 12.8, ‘to
ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified [CDM] project
activities is used to assist developing country Parties that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change
to meet the costs of adaptation’. With the setting up of the
Adaptation Fund (see below), a 2% share of proceeds from CDM
project revenue will contribute to adaptation funding.
The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005,
ninety days after Russia ratified it. Russian ratification was
crucial in the absence of the United States, adding another 17.4%
of Annex I emissions required to bring the protocol into force.
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Table 1. Indicators of responsibility by countries.10,42
Responsibility/emissions
Country Contribution to the global Change in CO2 emissions Emissions per capita Carbon intensity (tons of Change in carbon intensity
CO2 concentration increase (1990–2000) (%) (tons of C equiv. C per $GDP-PPP, 2000) (1990–2000) (%)
(1950–2000) (%) 2000, all gases)
Australia 1 26 6.6 193 –11.4
Canada 2 22 6.0 172 –7.8
EU 17 0 2.9 99 –18.1
Japan 5 12 2.8 104 –2.4
Russia 9 –32 3.8 427 2.6
U.S. 26 18 6.6 162 –14.5
China 10 39 1.1 201 –46.8
Brazil 1 53 1.8 73 17.6
India 3 64 0.5 99 –3.6
South Korea 1 85 3.0 185 2.1
Mexico 1 25 1.5 125 –11.3
South Africa 1 17 2.6 200 –1.7
World 100 14 1.6 147 –13.1
Capability Renewables Status in negotiations
Country GDP per capita Share of renewables in Kyoto Protocol ratification Submission of national
($PPP, 2000) electricity mix (2000) (%) communication
Australia 25 693 9 No Yes
Canada 27 840 61 Yes Yes
EU 23 645 15 Yes Yes
Japan 26 755 10 Yes Yes
Russia 8 406 19 Yes Yes
U.S. 34 142 9 No Yes
China 3 976 17 Yes No
Brazil 7 604 90 Yes No
India 2 358 14 Yes No
South Korea 17 470 2 Yes Yes
Mexico 8 985 19 Yes Yes
South Africa 9 466 1 Yes No
World 7 295 18.7
Multilateral environmental agreements not only require signa-
ture by delegates to a conference, but also ratification by national
processes. In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the conditions for
the instrument to enter into force were that it needed to be
signed and ratified by 55 countries, with total emissions account-
ing for 55% of the CO2 emissions from Annex I countries in the
year 1990. The emissions (CO2 only) for the base year (mostly
1990) are listed in Annex B of the protocol — mostly the same
parties as Annex I to the UNFCCC. Many developing countries
ratified early, satisfying the condition regarding the number of
ratifying countries. Progress towards the second condition,
regarding total emissions, was made by ratification by the
European Union (and its members), Japan, Canada and a few
other industrialized countries. Notably absent are the United
States and Australia, although they remain parties to the
conventions.
The U.S. made clear in March 2001 that it did not intend ratify-
ing the protocol, and Australia is also unlikely to change its
position. The U.S. alone accounted for 36.1% of emissions in
Annex B (and about 24% of global CO2 emissions, and 16% of all
GHGs in 2000). In part, the withdrawal of the U.S. consolidated
the political will of the rest of the world to go ahead and
complete the Marrakech Accords (at the COP-7 meeting in 2001).
The climate strategy of the Bush administration is to ‘reduce’
emissions intensity (GHG / GDP) by 18% until 2012. This target is
almost identical to the 17% actual reduction in the 1990s. The
proposed relative target would permit an increase in absolute
emissions for the largest emitter due to economic growth,
estimated at an overall increase in emissions of about 30% by
2012 compared to 1990. Internationally, the U.S. actively pursues
bilateral negotiations, including with major developing countries,
to promote cleaner and more efficient technologies (www.state.
gov/g/oes/climate/).
Russia played a long end-game before finally ratifying the
Kyoto Protocol. Participation in the flexible mechanisms was
financially attractive, but various departments within the Russian
administration differed in their views on the advantages of
ratification. Russian representatives at the World Summit on
Sustainable Development in 2002, and on several other occasions,
indicated that Russia would ratify. It appeared that concessions
related to negotiations under the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) were important in finally persuading the Duma and the
Russian president formally to ratify.
The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol had several implica-
tions. Politically, it represented a victory for multilateral negotia-
tions, despite the unilateralism shown by the United States.12 In
legal terms, the protocol is the first multilateral environmental
agreement with a binding compliance system — in other words,
if Annex I parties do not meet their targets, there are legally
binding consequences. Another legal implication of entry into
force of the Kyoto Protocol was the beginning of the round of
Meetings of the Parties (MOP) together with the UNFCCC COP
— with the U.S. and Australia parties to the latter but not the
former. The first ‘COP/MOP’ will be held in Montreal, Canada,
from 28 November to 9 December 2005.13 The formalization of
the protocol firmly established carbon markets under the proto-
col’s ‘flexible mechanisms’, with a noticeable upward impact on
carbon prices after the announcement of Russian ratification.
Projects, markets and finances
The Clean Development Mechanism
The CDM is another major development in carbon markets,
with about $800 million* invested so far. The CDM emerging
portfolio has the largest share of credits from the decomposition
of fluorine-containing gases [based on hydrofluorocarbons, 17%
of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)) and landfill gas projects
(23%)]. The single hydrofluorocarbon project is boosted by the
relatively high global warming potential of fluorinated gases,
whereas methane capture is the subject of several projects.
Measured by the number of projects, hydro-electricity is the
most popular project type, but the potential emission reductions
per project are relatively low (see Fig. 2).
Any lessons drawn from the CDM portfolio must be tempered
by recognition that the mechanism is only just emerging. Its
structure may well change, influenced by the maturing of the
CDM institutions themselves, competition from JI projects and
assigned amounts, the influence of the European Emissions
Trading System and its link to the CDM and other factors.
Most of the allocated investments (worth $800 million) in CDM
projects or purchases of CERs have been from public funds.14
There is a leveraging effect in that total project investment is
higher than the fund contribution — so overall investment in
actual projects should be about 6 to 8 times the $800 million.15
Total project investment can be expected to increase over time,
including more contributions from the private sector.
In the bigger context of international financial flows, total
overseas development aid in 2002 was $61.9 billion and direct
investment $49.8 billion, according to the OECD. This invest-
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*In this article, financial amounts are quoted in U.S. dollars ($) and euros (C).
Fig. 2. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) portfolio, showing the relative importance of the different sectors.14 Source: project documentation.
ment in climate change amelioration is thus much smaller. More
specifically, in the energy sector the World Energy Investment
Outlook recently estimated that $16 trillion would be needed in
energy supply infrastructure between 2001 and 2030.16 Of this,
60%, or $10 000 billion, is expected to be invested in the power
sector and a further 19% in oil and gas. Almost half of the total
investment is expected to be required in developing countries.
Initial investment allocations to the CDM were led by the
World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) and the Dutch
CERUPT tender, but several more funds have been established.
Climate-related funds are supported mostly by governments or
intergovernmental organizations (Table 2).
Mitigation funding through the GEF
Funding for mitigation projects in poor countries also flows
through the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, which is
effectively the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The GEF was
formed in the lead-up to the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, to
respond to the needs of various environmental conventions for
a financial mechanism. It is the main channel of funding for
developing countries under the UNFCCC. There are three
implementing agencies: the UN Environment Programme, the
UN Development Programme, and the World Bank. A legal
instrument governs the GEF, and a memorandum of agreement
between the GEF Council and the COP was drawn up at the
COP-1 meeting. The GEF Council — with 16 members from
developing countries, 14 from rich countries and two from
economies in transition — develops, adopts and evaluates
programmes. The role of the GEF in supporting the convention
as a financial mechanism is unique. It is accountable to the COP,
which reviews the mechanism every four years. Rich countries
are to provide the ‘agreed full incremental costs’ of items in
Protocol Article 10, which include both mitigation and adapta-
tion programmes.
The GEF’s programmes are focused specifically on climate
change. The vast majority of GEF climate change funding of
$1.5 billion has supported mitigation projects.17 The overall
funding for the GEF has been as follows (dates in brackets,
followed by total amounts pledged): for the pilot phase
(1990–94) $1.13 billion; First Replenishment (1995–98) $2 billion;
Second Replenishment (1998–2002) $2.75 billion; and Third
Replenishment (2002–06) $3 billion. Each of the four operational
programmes relates to mitigation — energy efficiency, renew-
able energy), sustainable transport, and reduction of cost of
low-GHG-emitting technologies. Figure 3 shows the breakdown
of spending in major areas in 2002, including enabling activities.
The six strategic priorities have also been focused on mitigation
— transformation of markets for high-volume, commercial
low-GHG products or processes; power sector policy frame-
works supporting renewable energy and energy efficiency,
increased access to local sources of financing; global market
aggregation and national innovation for emerging technologies;
and modal shifts in urban transport and clean vehicle/fuel
technologies. A seventh strategic priority on adaptation was
added at COP-9 in Milan.
The scale of investment is comparable with the CDM, but
smaller than development funding or foreign direct investment.
The size of the funding nevertheless has the potential to leverage
other investments, through co-financing, by a factor of four.18 An
example is the ‘Five Million Fund’ administered by the GEF,
which provides reliable financing to leverage private invest-
ment for renewable energy in remote locations. The fund aims to
link climate protection and poverty reduction, providing five
million households with renewable energy through a partner-
ship approach. The usual modus operandi of GEF has been
subsidizing investment costs for renewable energy projects, but
it has also tested a range of new approaches to financing. These
include contingent grants, revolving funds, private equity
approaches, loans and guarantees.19 Such approaches play an
important role in mobilizing private investment.
Other experience with mitigation programmes
Mitigation does not occur only through carbon markets, the
CDM and the GEF. A wide range of actors — Kyoto parties, U.S.
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Table 2. Major CDM investment allocations.14
Scheme Coverage Involvement Amount
Austria JI/CDM Austrian government C72m (2003–06)
BioCarbon Fund CDM/JI Interest from governments (e.g. Canada) and companies. $30–50m
Community Development CDM 4 governments (Austria, Canada, Italy, Netherlands), 7 companies $40–70m
Carbon Fund (Japanese, German, Spanish, Swiss)
CERUPT CDM Dutch government C32.5m
Denmark JI/CDM Danish government C120m to 2007
Finland CDM/JI Finnish government C10m
Germany JI/CDM KfW (Federal government and states) C25m (to C50m)
INCaF CDM Dutch government C44m
Italian Carbon Fund JI/CDM Italian government (also open to contributions from Italian companies) $20m (target $80m)
Japan Carbon Fund CDM/JI JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation) and DBJ (Development C31.3m + C23.5m
Bank of Japan)
NCDF CDM Dutch government $120–160m (32 Mt CO2-eq.)
PCF JI/CDM 6 governments (Canada, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, $180m
Japan Bank for International Cooperation) and 17 companies
Fig. 3. Investments in climate change through the Global Environment Facility
(GEF) (2002). The first number refers to the investment in $million, the second
indicates the share of total investment.
states, individual companies, brokers and international financial
institutions — are becoming involved in mitigation programmes.
Prior to the Marrakech Accords, parties to the convention
piloted mitigation programmes under the notion of ‘Activities
Implemented Jointly’ (AIJ). Initiated at COP-1 in 1995, this pilot
phase explicitly did not award carbon credits, and included both
developing countries and economies in transition. The main aim
was to gain experience with mitigation projects, and more
than 150 projects were registered in over 40 countries (see
http://unfccc.int/issues/aij.html). The future of these pilot projects
remains unclear. The U.S. launched its own (IJI) programme as
part of AIJ in 1993. The last round of projects was approved in
2000. Some 50 mitigation projects were funded under this
programme (see www.usiji.gov ).
Among Kyoto parties, early movers in the CDM have included
the Dutch government through ERUPT (JI) and CERUPT (CDM)
and the World Bank through the Prototype Carbon Fund. Some
of these funds aim at particular niches. For instance, the
Community Development Carbon Fund targets small-scale
mitigation projects that also improve the livelihoods of local
communities, and the BioCarbon Fund supports mitigation
projects combined with environmental benefit, adaptation and
poverty reduction (see http://carbonfinance.org/cdcf/home.cfm
and http://carbonfinance.org/biocarbon/home.cfm.). Invest-
ment by early movers in the CDM is at least in part intended
to influence the future market by setting de facto technical
standards and occupying market position.20
Joint Implementation under Article 6 of the protocol allows
investment in projects in countries with economies in transition.
The fundamental difference from the CDM is that, in this case,
both countries have caps on their national emissions under
Kyoto. The overall limitations mean that any errors in estimating
real emission reductions at the project level would reflect in the
national GHG registries (in so far as these are accurate).
Developing countries, while not formally required to meet
quantified mitigation targets, are taking significant action.21,22
Emissions intensity in China has decreased considerably in
recent years, almost 50% since 1990,10 partly in order to save
scarce energy and partly to reduce local air pollution. Policies
have included a reduction in coal and oil subsidies between
1990 and 1995. China has also introduced tax incentives for
constructing energy-efficient buildings, and now requires that
all industrial boilers co-generate electricity with their waste heat.
India has developed a domestic wind industry and has in the
past provided leadership in the climate negotiations.
National programmes have been established to pilot mitiga-
tion projects. Canada ran a GHG Emissions Reduction Trading
pilot programme throughout the country from 1998 to 2002. Ten
project proposals were reviewed in a multi-stakeholder process
and five were registered for trade. The programme established
mandatory review criteria and drew lessons from the experience
in a detailed report (see www.gert.org). Lessons included that
‘policy decision and rules are required’ on technical issues to
ensure effective trading programmes.
Regional governments are also engaging in climate mitiga-
tion. Oregon and Washington states have established a CO2
Standard and Climate Trust. Under the trust, new electricity
generation sources must meet a CO2 standard. Beyond a thresh-
old of 0.675 lbCO2/kWh, developers must either purchase
project-based credits directly to offset their commitments, or
pay a fixed fee to the trust. So far, over $5 million has been
invested via Climate Trust (www.energy.state.or.us/siting/
rules.htm; www.climatetrust.org), which has undertaken two
rounds of public solicitation of offsets, already contracting
2.5 MtCO2 over 20 years.
20
There is substantial experience in U.S. states with programmes
that focus on reducing local air, water and other pollution, with
the (uncredited) co-benefit of reducing GHG emissions. These
include Emissions Reduction Credit trading under the Clean Air
Act, which allows projects at existing emissions sources to help
new sources meet emission standards for criteria pollutants.
Similarly, the discrete emission reduction programme operates
in six U.S. states to enable compliance with state implementation
plans for air pollution. The California South Coast Air Quality
Management District established a Regional Clean Air Incen-
tives Market for large point sources of NOx and SOx, and allowed
projects to claim retrospective credits for emission reductions
already achieved at non-controlled sources.
The city of Seattle has established a GHG Target and Offset
Program, also known as Seattle City Lights. The target is net zero
electricity supply. Project-based credits can be purchased from
any location, although Washington State is preferred, and the
expectation is that 400 000 tCO2 per year will be purchased
(http://seattle.gov/light/News/RFI_RFP/RFP_ggm.asp).
The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) has set voluntary
targets for participants. There is a limited role for offsets in North
America, but foreign locations for projects (in addition to the
U.S.) are permitted, including Brazil and Canada. The CCX was
scheduled to start in 2003 and run until 2006 (www.chicago-
climateexchange.com)
More forward-looking companies are implementing voluntary
GHG emission reduction plans; for example, some motor
companies have increased their sales of hybrid vehicles. Euro-
pean companies need to meet regulations under the ETS and
thus are taking GHG emissions into account in their investment
strategies. Companies including TransAlta, a major coal-based
electricity producer in Canada, have set targets and begun
acquiring carbon credits as a learning and risk management
strategy in anticipation of future regulation. Emissions brokers
and project developers like CO2e.com, Natsource, Econergy,
and various accounting and engineering firms have also devel-
oping funds, and pooled approaches to building project-based
mitigation portfolios.20
Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in both in-
dustrialized and developing countries are committed to
promoting action on climate change. They provide information,
analysis and advocacy.
In addition to investment in mitigation projects, significant
work has been undertaken in establishing effective standards,
registries and reporting systems. The World Resources Institute
and the World Business Council on Sustainable Development
have established a GHG Protocol (www.ghgprotocol.org ). Since
developing its widely used Corporate GHG Accounting and
Reporting Standards for organizational inventories, they are
nearing completion of their first standards and guidelines
document for project-based mitigation activities. The environ-
mental NGO sector has produced a CDM gold standard to
ensure a higher quality of mitigation projects from the point of
view of sustainable development (www.panda.org/down-
loads/climate_change/thegoldstandardoverview.doc). Other
standards include NESCAUM (www.nescaum.org/Green-
house/Registry/state_matrix.html) and the Climate Registry
(www.climateregistry.org/).
Carbon markets: EU emission trading system
A key development in carbon markets is the European
Emissions Trading System (ETS). It is effectively a cap-and-trade
device to limit CO2 emissions from large industrial sources. The
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sectors covered are electricity (all fossil fuel generators over
20 MW), oil refining, cement production, iron and steel manu-
facture, glass and ceramics, and paper and pulp production.
Sectors will be reviewed in 2006 and smaller installations can
‘opt in’ from 2005–07. Targets must be in line with Euro-
pean countries’ domestic implementation of Kyoto commit-
ments.24
Central to the implementation of the ETS are national allocation
plans, to be developed by March 2004. These plans will set
targets for the relevant sectors and allocate allowances (each
worth one tonne of CO2), effectively setting absolute emission
caps for installations for the relevant periods. There will be
penalties for non-compliance. These allowances will be tradable,
and a ‘linking directive’ will allow units from CDM and JI
projects (subject to some conditions) to be substituted for
allowances.
The ETS will create significant financial flows, representing the
major carbon market before emissions trading under the Kyoto
Protocol starts from 2008. As a major carbon market, the ETS
might play an important role in a climate regime after 2012 (the
end of the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol). It
brought together a ‘Friends of Kyoto’ group — which could
include a broad range of developing countries, and major
industrialized ones (the enlarged EU, Canada, Japan, Norway,
Switzerland, and New Zealand). The ETS also will recognize
credits from emissions trading schemes set up elsewhere, specif-
ically mentioning the U.S. states of California and Oregon.25
Proposals to combine emissions trading markets might be more
attractive to the U.S. than joining Kyoto.26 The process of consoli-
dating markets could happen on a bilateral basis, separate from
the UNFCCC process.25 Each country would have to set a domestic
limit before becoming eligible to join the larger market — that is,
no trade without a cap.28
Adaptation funding
Financial flows for adaptation do not take the form of carbon
markets, but are channelled through funds administered by the
GEF. The earliest guidance given to the GEF, at COP 1 in Berlin,
provided for a staged approach to adaptation. In this decision,
the financial mechanism was asked to consider criteria for
supporting planning and studies of climate-change impacts
under the first stage. The second stage progresses onto measures
to prepare for adaptation. The third and most advanced stage is
concerned with measures to facilitate adaptation.
At COP-7, parties agreed there was a need for new and additional
funding beyond contributions which are allocated to the climate
change focal area of the GEF and to multilateral and bilateral
funding for the implementation of the convention. The scope
of activities eligible for funding was also included. The Least
Developed Country (LDC) Trust Fund and Special Climate
Change Fund (SCCF) were established under the convention,
and the Adaptation Fund under the protocol. All three funds are
to be operated by the GEF on the basis that each fund remains
distinct from the existing GEF Trust Fund used for climate
change activities, which shall remain in operation.
Many assessment and planning activities have already been
funded by the GEF, and the challenge is to define concrete
implementation activities. Significant progress has been made,
notably in prioritizing adaptation activities through a participatory
process of the National Adaptation Programme of Action by
LDCs. Under the LDC Trust Fund, the GEF has provided
$200 000 per country. Preliminary results are expected from 2005
onwards.
COP-7 agreed to establish the Special Climate Change Fund
under the convention to finance adaptation, technology transfer,
projects in a number of sectors (transport, industry, agriculture,
forestry, and waste management); and ‘activities to assist devel-
oping country parties referred to under Article 4.8 (h) in diversi-
fying their economies’. COP-8 advocated that this funding
should be complementary to other funds administered by the
GEF.
The Adaptation Fund operates under the protocol, and will
receive guidance from the COP/MOP once the protocol enters
into force, but until then from the COP. It will be financed by a
share (2%) of the proceeds from CDM projects as well as other
sources.
In response to guidance from COP-7, the GEF council approved
in November 2003 a seventh strategic priority on adaptation,
‘Piloting an operational approach to adaptation’, within the GEF
Trust Fund. The scheme is limited to pilot projects worth
$50 million during 2005–07. Pilots should show how adaptation
planning and assessment can be practically translated into
projects that will provide real benefits. Full costs are to be paid
only for small grants, while large and medium projects will
require co-financing. The pilot began in July 2004 and will
end when the LDC and Special Climate Change Funds start.
Adaptation has precedence in both these funds, with COP 9
providing guidance to the GEF for the operation of the Special
Climate Change Fund, prioritizing adaptation and technology
transfer.
A paper on ‘assistance to address adaptation’ for the GEF
Council in May 2004 indicates that adaptation activities must
be country-driven and integrated into national sustainable
development planning and poverty-reduction strategies.29 It
links local adaptation to GEF’s mandate in that the ‘need to
adapt to adverse impacts of climate change is an incremental
burden to developing countries, generated by a global environ-
mental impact’. Capacity building can be incremental and
targeted, and also have ‘a global dimension as they help vulnerable
countries and communities to address the global environmental
impact of climate change’.29
Key issues for the future: Sustainable development,
mitigation and adaptation
Mitigation
The discussions on mitigation within the UNFCCC negotia-
tions have evolved over time. Much of the early discussions
were influenced by concerns about ‘energy for sustainable
development’.30 In terms of demonstrating technologies, the
focus was often on renewable energy and energy efficiency.31
The operational programmes (OPs 5 and 6) of the GEF reflect this
focus. In the negotiations, however, the exclusion of specific
technologies was resisted. ‘Negative lists’ of technologies to
be excluded — for instance, cleaner coal or nuclear energy
technologies — were not endorsed in COP decisions, nor were
‘positive lists’ of renewables and efficiency. It was not seen as
government’s role, individually or in multi-lateral negotiations,
to pick technology winners, and the literature supported investi-
gation of different technologies and policies.32 The IPCC reviews
key developments in the knowledge around technological
options to mitigate GHG emissions.8,28
Recent discussions of mitigation efforts in developing coun-
tries have often been focused on the CDM (see below). While
clearly an important mechanism, sustainable development is at
least as important an approach to mitigation. The debates on
climate change mitigation and sustainable development have
been linked, in particular with the realization that a significant
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mitigation effort was already in place in developing countries.
More would be needed in future by ‘promoting development
while limiting greenhouse gas emissions’.33
Choosing a more sustainable development path means that
the baseline — or reference — GHG emissions are lower than in
other possible futures. The IPCC’s Third Assessment Report
found that this choice of future ‘world’ was more important than
the drivers determining GHG emissions.8 Beginning with one or
more future development ambitions, it would be possible to
describe paths towards those goals.8,34 The SRES reference
scenarios shown in Fig. 4 do not include any climate policy and
are shown together with mitigation scenarios resulting in
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 ranging from 450 to
750 ppmv. The selected scenarios show clearly that the gap
between the shaded reference path and the various (solid)
stabilization paths is smaller in some cases. In other words, to
reach the same atmospheric concentrations, significantly less
effort is required for development paths where reference emis-
sions are low (in the B family) than if the future world had higher
emissions (in the A scenarios). The implication is that there are
significant synergies between climate and non-climate policies.8
However, shifting development paths requires transitions in
larger systems, not least energy economies.35 This broader
approach to mitigation links back to ‘energy for sustainable
development’ and informs the debate about future mitigation
commitments of developing countries. The prospects for a
future round on quantified mitigation commitments are not on
the official agenda, but increasingly are discussed by research
organizations.36,37 With a review of ‘demonstrable progress’ due
in 2005 (under Protocol Article 3.2), these discussions may
become formal in the next few years.
The broader challenges of mitigation in developing countries
keeps raising the question of whether the focus of efforts should
be on climate change or sustainable development.38 Greater
capacity for adaptation is also enhanced by sustainable develop-
ment.
Adaptation: funding, mainstreaming, implementation
The core mandate of the GEF has been to fund the incremental
costs of global environmental benefits. The benefits of mitigation
are clearly global, since everyone benefits from reduced emissions
irrespective of where mitigation takes place. The consequences
of climate change will vary from place to place, and the ability of
poor communities to respond is the least, making them most
vulnerable.5 Some of the impacts of climate change can be
reduced by taking preventative action, but these depend on
location. Increasing the capacity to adapt has significant
co-benefits, but again these are largely local. The causes —
emissions leading to increased concentrations to climate impacts
— are global.39 The local nature of adaptation is at a different
geographical scale from the mandate for global environmental
benefits.40
Both adaptation and mitigation do not occur as discrete
activities but often arise as part of ongoing activities. Countries
anyway take measures to cope with natural climate variability,
and are continually investing in activities (such as energy
supply) that may emit more or less GHGs.
Analysis therefore is most realistic when it recognizes that
many adaptation and mitigation options involve adjusting
the orientation of ongoing investment and other activities
(‘mainstreaming’), rather than being discrete actions with easily
separated costs and benefits.41 The incremental benefits of adap-
tation are often not as clear as for mitigation projects, with many
activities simply requiring better development planning. For
example, adaptation might mean taking new flood lines into
account in planning housing, or modifying water resource
planning to take into account increased climate variability. These
activities already happen and are best supported by integrated
development planning.42
As adaptation activities can be capital-intensive and the
benefits highly localized and immediate, the real challenge
will be the development of secure, adequate and predictable
funding to meet priorities, as well as equitable frameworks to
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Fig. 4. Comparison of reference emissions scenarios (without climate policy) and climate change mitigation scenarios. IPCC, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change; SRES, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios of the IPCC.
access this funding. Apart from funds, tiered national and
regional insurance schemes have been proposed. They form
part of an approach that emphasizes managing and spreading
the risk to developing countries of climate effects such as
extreme weather events, aiding recovery efforts and contribut-
ing to sustainable development.
Prospects for the future: How might future emissions
targets be set?
Despite all these efforts, global emissions continue to increase.
They rose by 14% between 1990 and 200043 — and have continued
to rise ever since — even with the economic contraction and
corresponding reduced emissions from Russia and other
countries of the former Soviet Union, and in spite of the
adoption of international agreements on climate change. While
the current rate of emissions increase may be slightly slower
than ‘business as usual’, it is a barely marginal improvement.
Voluntary actions are not sufficient to deal with the scale of the
problem, which needs profound changes to current practices.
Addressing climate change effectively requires major transfor-
mations in the way we produce and consume energy.
Along with an emissions trading regime and the CDM, the
Kyoto Protocol set quantified and binding emission reduction
and limitation targets for Annex B countries, starting with a first
commitment period of 2008–12. Industrialized countries have
contributed most to GHG emissions over time. This is recog-
nized in the convention’s first stated principle in Article 3.1,
requiring the rich countries to take the lead in combating climate
change and its adverse effects.6 Hence, the Kyoto Protocol
quantified emissions reduction targets only for Annex I (under
the convention, or Annex B, under the protocol) parties. Clearly,
annual emissions from developing countries (non-Annex I,
hereafter NAI) are increasing. According to the World Resources
Institute, CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in poor countries
increased 38.9% between 1990 and 2000, resulting in a share of
40% of annual global emissions in 2000.43 Carbn dioxide emissions
per capita were 11.9 t for Annex I and 2.0 t for NAI countries in
2000.
Future emissions and ‘cross-over’ dates (when NAI emissions
will exceed those from Annex I countries as a group) are highly
sensitive to the assumed emissions scenario3 and on the basis
and units of comparison. Cross-over will occur relativelysoon if
one considers annual CO2 emissions; if the analysis is based on
temperature increase, cross-over comes much later. Annex I
countries emit primarily CO2, while developing economies with
large agricultural and forestry sectors can be expected to have a
higher share of methane and nitrous oxide in their totals —
hence it matters which gases are included. The different years of
convergence are apparent from the following quotations:44
The moment of convergence between the Annex I and non-
Annex I regions shifts from 2065 for only fossil-fuel CO2 emissions
to 2055 for all anthropogenic CO2 emissions and, finally, to 2030
for all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (page 57).
By using a modeling framework, we have shown that for a cen-
tral reference case the moment of convergence of contribution of
Annex I and non-Annex I is delayed from 2015, for anthropogenic
CO2 emissions, to 2045, for CO2 concentration, and, finally, to 2055
for temperature increase (page 63).
Including land-use related CO2 emissions and non-CO2 emis-
sions in calculating regional contributions to temperature change
sharply increases the share of non-Annex I in temperature
increase. However, the range of outcomes covered by the cases
‘only fossil fuel CO2 emissions’ and ‘all greenhouse gas emissions’
decreases in future, because of the increasing dominating effect of
the fossil fuel CO2 emissions in the overall CO2-equivalent emis-
sions (page 65).
Whatever analytical approach is taken, it is clear that the
contribution of developing countries as a group will constitute a
growing share in future. It is equally evident that the responsibility
of the rich nations will remain higher for a long time to come, if
the analysis is on a per capita basis — critical if the analysis is to
be fair,4 or considers cumulative emissions, which are the ones
that matter most to the climate.8
Maintaining the established FCCC principle that developed
countries take the lead, deeper cuts in emissions by all Annex I
countries will be required in future.37,46 Annex II commitments
under the convention and protocol to assist developing countries
financially will also continue. Indeed, as the need for quantified
mitigation targets in the more rapidly industrializing developing
countries grows, the requirements for funding will increase.
Further differentiation between poor countries will probably
be needed.37,46,47 NAI nations will expect Annex I states to take the
lead, but not all the former can be expected to follow in the same
way. Rapidly industrializing developing countries have some
capability of limiting or even reducing their emissions, if their
income and economic levels are an approximate guide. The most
advanced of these, the ‘newly industrialized countries’, have the
same average Human Development Index as economies in
transition, and an average GDP per capita of $10 700 compared
to $7 160 for the latter.36
For LDCs, by contrast, measures of responsibility for climate
change are very low — their total emissions of energy-related
CO2 accounted for less than 0.5% of the global total in 2000.
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These countries’ focus is primarily on adaptation to the impacts
of climate change.
Given the absence of the U.S. and Australia from the Kyoto
Protocol, initiatives outside of the formal UN process have
explored a range of alternatives. While the Kyoto Protocol has
entered into force, targets have been set only for Annex I
countries, and only for the first commitment period from 2008 to
2012. The next round of ‘post-2012’ negotiations will start in
2005, as Article 3.9 of the protocol requires negotiations for new
Annex I commitments to start seven years before the end of the
first commitment period.47 Politically, Annex I countries will exert
pressure on developing countries also to engage in mitigation —
in particular some of the larger emitters such as China, India,
Brazil and South Africa.
Of significance for our continent is that the British prime
minister, Tony Blair, has made climate change and Africa key
themes of the U.K. presidency of the G8 and of the EU during
2005. Ministers from 20 countries and representatives from
international bodies, business and non-governmental organiza-
tions participated in the Energy and Environment Ministerial
Roundtable held in London on 15–16 March 2005. They identified
not only key climate change goals, but also common ground
relating to energy and environment policy, economic develop-
ment and poverty eradication by improving the accessibility and
affordability of modern energy services.49 Much as Russian
ratification depended on linkages to WTO talks, there are some
indications that climate change after 2012 might be coupled to a
broader development agenda.
Conclusion
The gap between current targets and the projected emissions
means that a greater mitigation effort is needed. The IPCC’s
second assessment summarized the implications of continued
emissions and the required effort as follows:
If net global anthropogenic emissions (i.e. anthropogenic
sources minus anthropogenic sinks) were maintained at current
levels (about 7 GtC/yr including emissions from fossil fuel
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combustion, cement production and land-use change), they would
lead to a nearly constant rate of increase in atmospheric concentrations
for at least two centuries, reaching about 500 ppmv (approaching twice
the pre-industrial concentration of 280 ppmv) by the end of the 21st
century. Carbon cycle models show that immediate stabilization of the
concentration of carbon dioxide at its present level could only be
achieved through an immediate reduction in its emissions of 50–70%
and further reductions thereafter.7
Developing countries — in particular the more rapidly indus-
trializing ones like South Africa — will need to face up to their
global responsibility. The more such efforts can be aligned with
local plans for sustainable development, the more likely they
will be implemented.
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